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ABSTRACT
This note considers whether the interaction of whistleblower protec-
tions and incentives provided by the False Claims Act and the disclosure re-
quirements of the recently enacted Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 transform
qui tam relators' investigatory conduct into unconstitutional government
searches. Applying several prevailing theories of state action, this note argues
that these factors can and likely do transform relator conduct into govern-
ment action with unsettling consequences: personal liability for relators and
suppressibility of relator-collected evidence. Both consequences undermine
the purpose of the False Claims Act by deterring those sought for help from
coming to the Government's aid and by severely diminishing the value of
relators' efforts.
I. INTRODUCTION
It should not surprise anyone that the Federal Government has always been
ill equipped to detect fraud, waste, and abuse committed against it.' Through
the False Claims Act (FCA or Act),2 however, the Government has crafted a
1. See Robert Salcido, Soeening Out Unworthy Whistleblower Actions: An Historical Analysis of
the Public Disclosure Jurisdictional Bar to Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act, 24 PUB. CONT.
LJ. 237, 257 (1995) (indicating that governmental complacency, corruption, and scarce resources
make federal fraud prevention difficult to execute).
2. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (2000).
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statutory scheme to help recover money taken under false pretenses. One of
the most important aspects of the FCA is its qui tam3 provision, which empow-
ers private citizens, called relators, to bring suits on behalf of the Government
against falsely claiming entities. In exchange for the information provided
and services rendered, the Government assigns to the relator a portion of any
judgment or settlement it recovers. 4
The False Claims Act's overall scheme, including its qui tam provision, has
proven very effective and a necessary tool in combating various types of gov-
ernment contract fraud, as illustrated by massive annual recoveries. In 2006
alone, a banner year according to the Department of Justice, the Government
recovered over $3.1 billion, handily overshadowing the previous record of
$2.2 billion recovered in 2003.1
Relator searches for information, however-information the Government
often uses to support related criminal prosecutions and administrative
proceedings 6-could potentially infringe upon the Fourth Amendment rights
of those being investigated. This note asserts that key provisions of the FCA
have the potential to induce searches by relators that would be otherwise con-
stitutionally impermissible if carried out by government agents.
Part II of this note provides a brief overview of the FCA's enactment, sub-
sequent amendment, and current impact, and identifies five critical features
of the Act and companion legislation that collectively suggest state action.
Part III outlines and applies several prevailing theories of state action-public
function theory, inducement/coercion theory, and symbiosis/entwinement
theory-to relators' investigatory conduct. As state actors, relators could
be liable in Bivens7 actions for injuries resulting from Fourth Amendment
violations.
3. Id. § 3730. Qui tam is short for "'qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte
sequitur' meaning 'Who sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself."' BLAcK's LAw
DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990); see also William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as
Monitoring Devices in Government Contracting, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1823-24 (1996) (stat-
ing that "the qui tam mechanism decreases the likelihood that meritorious cases will languish
because the purchasing agency or DOJ, owing to sloth, negligence, or deliberate policy choices
designed to protect specific programs from needed scrutiny, declines to investigate and attack
apparent episodes of fraud").
4. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 n.4
(2000) ("[A] qui tam relator 'is, in effect, suing as assignee of the United States'"); see also infia
Part I.D.1.
5. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Record $3.1 Billion in
Fraud and False Claims in Fiscal Year 2006: Largest Amount Ever Recovered in a Single Year
(Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/November/06 civ 783.html.
6. See Jared E. Mitchem, Parallel Proceedings: Conurirent Qui Tam and Grand jury Litigation,
51 AtA. L. REV. 391, 391 (1999) ("Federal 'qui tam' lawsuits under the False Claims Act ('FCA'),
for example, often lead to federal law enforcement involvement and may lead to related crimi-
nal investigations and prosecution .... Additional proceedings might include administrative
proceedings... ").
7. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395
(1971); see also infra Part V.A.
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Part IV distinguishes FCA relators from other types of quasi-public actors,
namely bounty hunters and IRS informants, whom courts have determined
do not act under color of law. Part V then addresses the potential Fourth
Amendment implications of relator searches, specifically, whether evidence
obtained by relators in furtherance of FCA actions would be suppressible in
parallel, noncivil proceedings.
Finally, Parts VI and VII, respectively, address potential weaknesses of
this novel application of state action theory to relators' investigatory con-
duct and possible solutions to the imminent conflict. Minor changes to the
FCA's payment structure, greater guidance for relators on properly obtaining
evidence, and more stringent government auditing systems could diminish
the likelihood that relators will be subjected to suit for unlawful searches and
that evidence will be suppressed in noncivil enforcement cases.
II. WHAT IS THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT?
A. A Brief History of the False Claims Act
Congress passed the civil False Claims Act in 1863, at the height of the
Civil War, to stem serious fiscal hemorrhaging exacerbated by "widely pub-
licized abuses by unscrupulous private contractors."8 These contractors infa-
mously provided, among other things, diseased mules and faulty muskets to
the Union army.9 The Act was also known as the "Informer's Act" because of
its qui tam provision, 10 a vestige of the feudal English legal system11 that had
all but vanished in U.S. federal law by the turn of the century. 2
At the end of the Civil War, the number of false claims ebbed,13 but the
New Deal's enactment and the subsequent onset of World War II signaled a
resurgence. 14 Overzealous and "parasitic" whistleblowers abounded as well.
The loosely crafted qui tam provision allowed relators to use information
found in criminal indictments to support their civil actions." Such oppor-
tunistic whistleblowers, like the one in the seminal case, United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess,6 prompted the first major amendments to the original Act
8. 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui TAM AcTIONS § 1.01 [A] (3d ed. 2006) (citing
United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607, 609 (N.D.
Cal. 1989)).
9. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REv. 939, 942 (2002).
10. See 1 BoEsE, supra note 8, § 1.01[A] (citing 89 CONG. REc. S7596 (1943) (statement of Sen.
Revercomb)).
11. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
12. 1 BoEsE, supra note 8, § 1.01[A].
13. Id. § 1.01[B].
14. Id. § 1.02.
15. Id. § 1.01[B].
16. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). The Department ofJustice, as it is wont to do, contested the contri-
bution of the whistleblower, Morris Marcus, for allegedly copying a criminal indictment directly
to support his civil action. Id. at 545. In upholding Mr. Hess's share of the judgment, the Court
noted Congress could have required, but did not require that the whistleblower provide original
information to partake in the bounty. Id. at 546.
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in 1943,17 including an absolute jurisdictional bar over qui tam suits if the
Government had prior knowledge of the complaint's allegations. 8 The more
stringent whistleblower qualifications achieved their goal: decreased use, and
abuse, of the qui tam provision by parasitic relators. 19
B. The 1986Amendments
Dramatic escalations in spending during the Vietnam War and the later
phases of the Cold War, as well as the expansion of federally funded social
service programs, triggered an increase in both the number of government-
initiated FCA actions and the types of persons and organizations targeted.2"
In 1986, Congress again amended several provisions of the Act, only this time
to enhance relator protection and enticements to combat "rampant fraud and
governmental acquiescence."21 The key changes included an increase from
double to treble damages;22 an increase in penalties from $2,000 per false
claim to not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000 per false claim;23 and
expanded involvement and protection of qui tam relators.2 4 The amendments
guaranteed a relator's minimum share of the bounty, set a higher maximum
share in a successful action,2" and provided a federal cause of action for em-
ployment discrimination against employers who retaliated against relator-
employees .26
Over time, the Government found the newly amended FCA an effec-
tive weapon to combat fraud in many industries, most notably health care.27
Moreover, the protections granted to relators not only bolstered qui tam ac-
tions but fortified enforcement under the entire scheme. Data from the last
twenty years illustrate the increasingly crucial role relators have played in civil
fraud enforcement: they have recovered billions for the Government and the
Government has in turn shared billions with them.




21. Id. § 1.04[A] (citing S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5267-68); see also S. REP. No. 99-345, at 23-24 ("[T]o encourage more private enforce-
ment suits."). The 1980s were rife with infamous reports of $400 hammers and $600 toilet seats.
See Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public Law
Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315, 333 n.106 (2001).
22. 1 BOESE, supra note 8, § 1.04[E].
23. 1 JOHN T. BoEsE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui TAM ACTIONS § 1.04[F] (3d ed. 2006 &
Supp. 2007). The Department of Justice adjusted these penalties upward for inflation to $5,500
and $11,000, effective Sept. 29, 1999. Id.
24. Id. § 1.04[G].
25. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)-(2) (2000) (setting the recovery range at 15-25 percent if the
Government intervenes and 25-30 percent without intervention).
26. Id. § 3730(h).
27. See Bucy, supra note 9, at 942 ("Today, the FCA is used to combat fraud by any and all
federal government contractors, including health care providers, defense contractors, and oil and
gas companies.").
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Table 1: Number of New False Claims Act
Matters by Year*
New Matters
FY Non Qui Tam Qui Tam Total
1987 361 66 427
1988 246 60 306
1989 236 95 331
1990 256 82 338
1991 243 90 333
1992 357 119 476
1993 329 132 461
1994 291 222 513
1995 236 277 513
1996 187 363 550
1997 185 533 718
1998 119 470 589
1999 141 481 622
2000 96 367 463
2001 88 309 397
2002 63 320 383
2003 93 334 427
2004 113 415 528
2005 100 394 494
Total 3,740 5,129 8,869
* TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDuc. FUND, FRAUD STATISTICS-
OVERVIEW 1 (2006), available at http://www.taf.org/fcastatistics2006.pdf
C. Five Critical Features of the False Claims Act
This note focuses on five critical features of the current False Claims Act
and companion legislation that, considered together, suggest the Government's
significant involvement in relators' private searches. The first two features-a
guaranteed share of the bounty and relator protection from an employer's
retaliatory conduct-potentially induce and encourage private searches. The
third and fourth features-the "original source" jurisdictional bar and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s specific pleading requirement-effectively guide
and direct relator investigatory conduct. The final feature-the Deficit
Reduction Act's disclosure requirements-effectively deputizes a covered
entity's employees as government investigators. This part outlines these criti-
cal features and briefly describes their impact on state action analysis.
1. Relator's Guaranteed Share of the Bounty-31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)
It is axiomatic that rewards induce action. Under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1), a
relator who is not involved in the wrongdoing but who meets all other statutory
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Table 2: FCA Settlements/Judgments and Relator Awards by Year*
Settlements and Judgments Total Relator
FY Non Qui Tam Qui Tam Total Share Awards
1987 $ 86,479,949 $ 0 $ 86,479,949 $ 0
1988 172,843,696 390,431 173,234,127 97,388
1989 197,202,180 15,111,719 212,313,899 1,446,770
1990 193,239,367 40,558,367 233,797,734 6,611,606
1991 270,945,467 69,775,271 340,720,738 10,686,287
1992 136,862,236 135,093,903 271,956,139 24,456,432
1993 187,234,076 177,416,383 364,650,459 27,393,036
1994 706,187,897 381,468,397 1,087,656,294 70,651,476
1995 279,522,866 247,276,827 526,799,693 46,992,617
1996 247,357,271 138,598,636 385,955,907 26,089,597
1997 468,549,359 629,802,525 1,098,351,884 67,920,267
1998 151,585,794 462,038,795 613,624,589 78,188,694
1999 196,613,009 516,778,031 713,391,040 67,007,516
2000 367,887,197 1,204,367,754 1,572,254,951 183,992,120
2001 494,496,974 1,300,831,678 1,795,328,652 217,770,693
2002 113,692,470 1,096,472,934 1,210,165,404 164,791,975
2003 703,003,368 1,516,226,572 2,219,229,940 327,603,286
2004 115,656,023 565,547,564 681,203,587 112,061,136
2005 276,794,983 1,141,743,736 1,418,538,719 166,375,477
Total $5,366,154,182 $ 9,639,499,523 $15,005,653,705 $1,600,136,373
* TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND, FRAUD STATISTICS-OVERVIEW 1 (2006), available at
http://www.taf.org/fcastaistics2006.pdf.
requirements in a successful action in which the Government intervenes and
recovers from the defendant is guaranteed to "receive at least 15 percent but
not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the
claim" plus reasonable attorney fees.28 If the Government does not intervene,
a relator proceeds with litigation independently and, if successful, shall recover
"not less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the
action or settlement ........'Where within the range the relator will recover is
discretionary, "depending upon the extent to which the person substantially
contributed to the prosecution of the action.""3 If the relator "planned and
initiated" the wrongdoing, the court may reduce his or her share "to the extent
28. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2000); see also 1 BOESE, supra note 8, § 4.08[A].
29. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2). The Government's willingness to allow relators to pursue less-
promising claims further manifests more than its mere acquiescence in relator conduct. See infra
Part JV.B.
30. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). The legislative history outlines some consideration factors, includ-
ing the significance of the information and the extent to which that information contributed to
the result. See S. RP. No. 99-345, at 28 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5293. The
Department ofJustice considers a myriad of factors in favor of increasing or decreasing a relator's
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the court considers appropriate";" relators who are criminally convicted for
the conduct giving rise to the action cannot receive anything.
2
Note that a relator is guaranteed a reward only if the action results in a
payment to the Government. By inextricably tying a relator's recovery to the
Government's, the FCA does more than just invite relators to provide helpful
information: it incentivizes them to uncover as much fraud as possible, to dig for
the most incriminating evidence they can find to ensure a positive outcome.
2. Protection from Retaliatory Termination-31 U.S.C. § 3 730(h)
A relator protected is a relator emboldened. Section 3730(h), commonly
known as the "whistleblower protection" provision, provides an employee-
relator a federal employment discrimination cause of action for his employer's
retaliatory behavior. The provision extends "all relief necessary" to
[a]ny employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or
in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employ-
ment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf
of the employee or others in furtherance of an action under this section, including
investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be
filed under this section... 33
Courts addressing complaints filed under this section have extended pro-
tection to investigations as well as reports of fraud.34 "An employee need not
have actual knowledge of the FCA for her actions to be considered 'protected
activity' ....-.5
For conduct to be protected, however, it must have a specific connection
to an FCA action, be reasonably calculated to uncover fraudulent claims,36
and be sufficient to put the defendant "on notice that [the relator] was ei-
ther taking action in furtherance of a private qui tam action or assisting in
an FCA action brought by the [G]overnment."37 Proof of notice is critical
share. See 1 BOESE, supra note 8, § 4.08[A]. If a relator, as an original source, primarily relies on
public information to support his or her action, and the Government intervenes and proceeds
with the action, he or she may receive no more than 10 percent. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
31. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 3730(h).
34. See United States ex rel. Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d 730, 733 (7th Cir.
1999) ("Only investigation, testimony, and litigation are protected"); Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 33
F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cit. 1994).
35. Fanslow v. Chicago Mfg. Ctr., 384 F.3d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 2004).
36. See 1 BOESE, supra note 23, § 4.1 1[B][1]; Schuhardtv. Wash. Univ., 390 F.3d 563,567 (8th Cir.
2004). The Schuhardt court also focused on the "scope of the job" as relied upon in Robertson v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, 32 F.3d 948, 952 (5th Cir. 1995). Schuhardt, 390 F.3d at 567.
37. United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514,1522 (10th Cit.
1996) (citing Robertson, 32 F.3d at 950-51). The Ramseyer court was clear to point out that "the
monitoring and reporting activities described in plaintiffs complaint were exactly those activities
plaintiff was required to undertake in fulfillment of her job duties, and plaintiff took no steps to
put defendants on notice that she was acting 'in furtherance of' an FCA action..." Id. at 1523.
Senate reports suggest that a "whistleblower must show the employer had knowledge the em-
ployee engaged in 'protected activity'.... S. REP. No. 99-345, at 35 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5300.
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to demonstrating retaliation.38 Merely engaging in conduct required as part
of one's job might not suffice to put an employer on notice, thereby defeat-
ing a relator's claim of retaliatory termination.39 It is not enough that the
conduct be aimed at compelling compliance with the regulatory scheme. 4°
Some courts, however, have protected an employee who lodged serious al-
legations of his employer's fraud and whose day-to-day duties did not involve
investigating fraud.41
Protection from employer retaliation, which only inheres to a relator
when he goes beyond his job duties to investigate fraud, emboldens relators
to conduct searches and to access company documents otherwise unavailable
to them. As such, when an employee invokes the FCA to put his employer
on notice, he effectively flashes a badge of governmental authority. An em-
ployer thereby put on notice of a relator's authority to access, and intentions
in accessing, such information is effectively hamstrung and must endure the
invasion or else be subject to suit in federal courts for retaliation. 42
3. "Original Source" Requirement-31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess,43 Congress enacted in 1943 a jurisdictional bar to qui tam actions to pre-
vent relators from bringing "parasitic" qui tam suits.44 Today, that bar remains
codified in section 3730(e)(4)(A), which precludes a court's jurisdiction over
an FCA action if a disclosure, sufficient to reveal the elements of a false or
fraudulent transaction, occurs in any of three scenarios: (1) criminal, civil,
or administrative hearings; (2) congressional, administrative, or Government
Accountability Office reports, hearings, audits, or investigations; or (3) the
news media.41 Practically speaking, relators cannot take advantage of informa-
tion when it is revealed to a "stranger to the fraud," when disclosure is suf-
ficient to put federal authorities on notice of fraud, when allegations of fraud
are injected into the "public domain," or when it is disclosed to any member
of the public.46
38. Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1522. ("If defendants were not afforded such notice, then, afortiori,
their actions could not constitute retaliation.").
39. The court in Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron found the fact that "Robertson ha[d] identi-
fied no change in his conduct that might have objectively demonstrated his qui tam intentions"
did not support a finding that the defendant was on notice of Robertson's qui tam investigation.
32 F.3d at 952.
40. See Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ("We
decline to extend general investigations of regulatory non-compliance into per se employee in-
vestigations of an employer's alleged fraud upon the government.").
41. See 1 BOESE, supra note 23, § 4.11[B] [1].
42. Whistleblower protection also guides relator conduct because it only applies when a relator
goes beyond his or her job duties.
43. 317 U.S. 537 (1942).
44. See 1 BoEsE, supra note 8, § 4.02[A].
45. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(2000). This is the most frequently litigated issue in qui tam suits
under the FCA. See 1 BOESE, supra note 8, § 4.02[A].
46. 1 BoasE, supra note 8, § 4.02[B].
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Public disclosure will not prove fatal to a relator's case, however, if he
or she is the "original source" of the information. Under § 3730(e)(4)(B),
a relator is an "original source" if he or she has "direct and independent
knowledge of the information" supporting the allegations and he or she
"voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing"
the FCA action. 47 Depending on the circuit, "direct knowledge" must be ei-
ther free from "intervening agency, instrumentality, or influence" or gained
"firsthand, and unmediated by anything but the plaintiffs own labor.
48
This means that collateral research and investigations... [do] not estab-
lish direct and independent knowledge .... ,,49 Some circuits require that
actions be based on entirely nonpublic knowledge, while others only re-
quire personal knowledge of "any essential element of the underlying fraud
transaction. "
The Supreme Court recently tightened the scope of the original source re-
quirement in Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, settling some of the
uncertainty surrounding the term "allegation" as used in the original source
requirement."1 The Court decided that a relator must have direct and inde-
pendent knowledge of the facts supporting allegations in both the original
and amended complaints in order for a court to have jurisdiction over the
case. 2 Government intervention cannot cure infirmities in pleading and does
not provide an independent basis for jurisdiction over the relator's action. 3
In sum, courts will only have jurisdiction over cases in which relators have
come across information concerning fraud firsthand and have shared that in-
formation with the Government (and no one else) before filing the action.
The original source requirement, therefore, encourages relators to investi-
gate fraud on their own without either sharing information with others or
relying too much on information provided by others.
4. Pleading with Particularity-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
FCA actions concern fraud. As such, complaints filed by relators are sub-
ject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires in pertinent part
that "the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
47. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). This "prior notice" feature seeks to prevent additional harm
and "reduces perverse incentives that otherwise exist in a bounty system" that ties a relator's share
directly to the damages accrued. 1 BoEsE, supra note 8, § 4.02[D][5].
48. 1 BOESE, supra note 23, § 4.02 [D] [2] [a].
49. United States ex rel. Kennard v. Comstock Res., Inc., 363 F.3d 1039, 1045 (10th Cir.
2004).
50. 1 BOESE, supra note 23, § 4.02 [D] [2] [c] [iii] (emphasis added).
51. 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1408 (2007).
52. Id. ("[A] limitation of § 3730(e)(4)'s requirement to the relator's initial complaint.. would
leave the relator free to plead a trivial theory of fraud for which he had some direct and inde-
pendent knowledge and later amend the complaint to include theories copied from the public
domain or from materials in the Government's possession.").
53. Id. at 1411 ("An action brought by a private person does not become one brought by the
Government just because the Government intervenes and elects to 'proceed with the action.' ").
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particularity." 4 Almost every court of appeals strictly applies Rule 9(b) to all
of a qui tam relator's pleadings.5"
Rule 9(b) requires that complaints specify the time, place, persons involved,
and fraudulent nature of the alleged acts.56 In some circuits, this means the
complaint must detail the specific "who, what, when, where, and how" of fraud-
ulent claims actually submitted to the Government.57 Pleading "systematic"
or "widespread" fraud will not suffice, and courts will look for a link between
a fraudulent scheme and the submission of fraudulent claims.58 Courts will
also hold particularly experienced, "inside" relators to a higher standard of
pleading. 9 When information is in the sole hands of the defendant, however,
courts are willing to relax the rule if the complaint sets forth a factual basis
for belief of fraud. 60
In concertwith the "original source" requirement, Rule 9(b)'s stringentplead-
ing requirements effectively force relators thinking of filing actions to uncover
clear evidence of specific fraudulent claims. Such clear evidence often consists
of company documents discovered and seized during employee-conducted
searches: it is not uncommon for relators to actually take materials from their
employer to support their cause of action.61
5. Mandatory Disclosures-Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA)
The Federal Government has pushed in recent years to further broaden
false claims litigation, most notably through the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
55. See 2 JoN T. BoEsE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui TAM ACTIONS § 5.04 (3d ed. 2006 &
Supp. 2007-2); United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 641-42
(6th Cir. 2003) ("[Wihen pleading violations of the FCA, a fraud statute, one necessarily makes
averments of fraud and necessarily must state with particularity the circumstances constituting
the fraud."); United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1309-10 (1 1th Cit.
2002) ("Mt was 'well settled' and 'self-evident' that the False Claims Act is 'a fraud statute' for
the purposes of Rule 9(b).").
56. See 2 BOESE, supra note 55, § 5.04[B]; see also United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare
Mgmt. Group, 193 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 1999) ("A special relaxing of Rule 9(b) is a qui tam
plaintiffs ticket to the discovery process that the statute itself does not contemplate.").
57. See 2 BOESE, supra note 55, § 5.04[B]; Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1306. For a list of cases applying
Rule 9(b) stringently, see 2 BOESE, supra note 55, § 5.04[B] [2].
58. See 2 BOESE, supra note 55, § 5.04[B][2]. However, if a relator is "privy to...the [defen-
dant's] internal billing practices," a general allegation will have more indicia of reliability than
would a general allegation made by a person who would not normally have firsthand exposure to
the illicit conduct. Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., No. 02-14429, 2003 WL 22019936, at *4-5
(I Ith Cit. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam); cf Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014-15 (1 1th
Cit. 2005) (relator, a sales employee, did not "have access to the specific billing information...
submitted to the government" and therefore could not prevail on mere assertions of awareness
without specifically stating the who, what, when, where, etc.).
59. See United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir.
2001).
60. See United States ex rel. Yannacopolous v. Gen. Dynamics, 315 F. Supp. 2d 939, 945 (N.D.
Ill. 2004).
61. See X Corp. v. John Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1301 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Under
Seal v. Under Seal, 17 F.3d 1435 (4th Cir. 1994) ("On leaving X Corp.'s employ, Doe took with
him copies of certain documents and files, leaving the originals with X Corp.").
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(DRA).62 The FCA-relevant provision, added by Senator Chuck Grassley (prin-
cipal author of the 1986 Amendments63), aims to reduce Medicaid spending in
two significant ways: first, by providing strong economic incentives to states that
enact their own false claims acts with qui tam provisions to combat Medicaid
fraud; 64 second, by requiring that government contractors make disclosures to
all employees regarding their rights under the FCA.61 Specifically, the DRA re-
quires all entities making or receiving more than $5 million in annual Medicaid
payments to distribute written disclosures to "all employees of the entity (in-
cluding management), and of any contractor or agent of the entity" providing
detailed information about federal and state FCAs, about the entity's fraud de-
tection and waste prevention procedures, and about the rights of employees to
be protected as whistleblowers.66 The Congressional Budget Office estimates
DRA Medicaid savings will total over $1 billion through 2015.67
In addition to promoting state-level false claims litigation under com-
panion state statutes, the new federally required disclosures will effectively
"deputize" countless new, potential investigators. Most troublesome is how
vague the DRA's disclosure requirements are: they merely mandate alerting
employees of how to bring false claims actions without detailing limitations
on how evidence can and should be culled. Potential relators are effectively
sworn in as government investigators upon receiving these disclosures but,
unlike police officers,6" are not told how to wield their power properly.
III. STATE ACTION THEORY
A. Introduction
This part considers whether the five critical features of the FCA suffice to
convert private relator conduct into government action. It is possible that in
many cases they do.
The Fourteenth Amendment proscribes a state from "depriv[ing] any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; [and from] deny[ing] to
62. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396h (LexisNexis Supp. 2007). The DRA became effective January 1,
2007. Id. § 1396h(c).
63. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa, Grassley Statement at Oversight
of U.S. Justice Department Hearing (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?FuseAction = PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease id = 51ad100e-5068-41e9-
b4fc-438cc85c94f1&Month = 1&Year = 2007.
64. States that enacted provisions that closely modeled or surpassed the federal FCA received
a 10 percent reduction "in the amount owed by the state to the federal government for the
federal portion of any Medicaid recovery under a qualifying state FCA." 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396h
(LexisNexis Supp. 2007); 1 BOESE, supra note 23, § 1.04[H11][3]-[4].
65. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396a(a)(68) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2007).
66. Id.
67. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, S. 1932 DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005 at
36, 39 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7028/sl932conf.pdf.
68. See Charles D. Weisselberg, In the Stationbouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1121,
1135 (2001), for a discussion of the critical role of training in officers' understanding of search
and seizure law.
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any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."69 Only when
the state or its agent has infringed upon an individual's constitutionally protected
rights will the Fourteenth Amendment apply.70 Courts have refused to find con-
stitutional violations when a private person conducted himself in a wrongful way
without government involvement, albeit for the Government's benefit.7'
Finding state action, however, has proven difficult, particularly when the
Government does not act overtly through its officers but rather involves itself
surreptitiously through government-sanctioned or supported private conduct.
As the Court noted in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, "[T]o fash-
ion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility.., is an
'impossible task' which 'This Court has never attempted.' Only by sifting
facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance."72 Courts continue
to struggle to properly apply state action theory, often rendering decisions
"clearly inconsistent" with previously decided cases.73 Even some scholars
cannot agree as to how many state action tests actually exist.' 4 Nevertheless,
the state action question remains a critical one, serving as a prelude to the
actual constitutional claim against a private party. 5
Today, courts ask two basic questions to find state action: (1) Did the private
entity engage in a traditional and exclusive public function?76 and (2) Is there a
sufficient enough nexus between the Government and private conduct?77 A court
need only answer one of the two questions affirmatively to find state action.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
70. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ("[T]he action inhibited by the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.
That Amendment erects no such shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.") (emphasis added).
71. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) ("Careful adherence to the 'state
action' requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law
and federal judicial power. It also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsi-
bility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.").
72. 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (internal citations omitted).
73. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.4.4.1 (3d ed.
2006) ("It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a meaningful line as to the point where the in-
volvement is great enough to require private action to comply with the Constitution"); see also
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-96 (2001) ("What is
fairly attributable is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity... [N]o
one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board for finding state action; nor is any
set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason against
attributing activity to the government.").
74. See Martin A. Schwartz, New Issues Arising Under Section 1983, 18 ToURO L. REv. 641, 645
(2002). Professor Chemerinsky argues there are two, while Professor Schwartz argues there are
four, or perhaps three, or even five. Id.
75. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1475 n.375
(2003).
76. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (asking whether a private en-
tity exercises "powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State").
77. That is, whether "there is such a 'close nexus between the State and the challenged action'
that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." BrentwoodAcad.,
531 U.S. at 295 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351).
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B. Public Function Test
1. "A Traditional and Exclusive Government Function"
First articulated in Marsh v. Alabama, the public function theory initially
treated any private person or entity performing a traditional government func-
tion as the Government itself.78 Attempts to apply this principle broadly to
other types of private conduct, however, proved much less successful.79 In
nonproperty cases, for example, the Court severely limited its findings of state
action to cases in which a private entity exercised "some power delegated to
it by the State which is traditionally associated with sovereignty"8 or an "ex-
clusive public function.""1
Notwithstanding this test's limitations, the public function theory remains
viable. In 2005, the Sixth Circuit applied the public function theory to hold
that casino security officers, vested under Michigan law with the plenary
power to make arrests without a warrant (authority traditionally entrusted to
state peace officers), were state actors performing a traditional public func-
tion. 2 In 2003, the Fifth Circuit applied the theory to hold that a private
prison-management corporation performed a fundamentally governmental
function, notwithstanding the fact that private entities occasionally detained
prisoners.83 The Second Circuit used the theory to find that a volunteer
fire department wrongfully discharged a fireman in violation of his First
78. 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946). In Marsh, a privately owned store operating in the business
district of Chickasaw, Alabama-a town owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation-had a
Jehovah's Witness arrested for trespass for distributing religious leaflets in front of the store. Id.
Later cases, however, severely limited Marsh to circumstances where private property had taken
on all, not merely some or even most, of the attributes of a municipality. See, e.g., Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 516-17 (1976).
79. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 345 (holding that a privately run public utility was not per-
forming a traditional public function); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165-66 (1978) (hold-
ing that private use repossession is not a traditional public function); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (holding that running a private school for troubled children is not a
traditional public function); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 55-57 (1999) (hold-
ing that providing private workers' compensation comparable with the public structure is not a
traditional public function).
80. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353.
81. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 161-62 (refusing to find state action in a private warehouseman's
sale of another's property because the sale was merely authorized, not required, by New York's
Uniform Commercial Code); see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (holding that
private operation of a recreational park was "more like a fire department or police department
that traditionally serves the community" because "[m]ass recreation through the use of parks is
plainly in the public domain"); West v. Adkins, 487 U.S. 42, 53-55 (1988) (holding that the medi-
cal treatment of prison inmates in a public prison, even if by a privately contracted physician,
was a traditional and exclusive public function); Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 628 (1991) (finding state action when a private litigant exercised a racially discriminatory
peremptory challenge during civil jury empanelling because the state had delegated to the private
litigant the traditional government power of choosing state officials).
82. Romanski v. Detroit Entm't, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 638 (6th Cir. 2005).
83. Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Skelton v.
Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cit. 1991); Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d
700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985).
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Amendment rights 4 and that a private child-caring institution wrongfully
retained custody of children on behalf of the state.8 5 Several district courts
have applied the theory in similar cases.86
2. Applying the Public Function Theory to the False Claims Act
For the public function theory to apply to the qui tam provision of the False
Claims Act, the relator must perform a function traditionally associated with
sovereignty and exclusively retained and exercised by the Government. This
note focuses exclusively on the relator's pre-complaint investigatory conduct
aimed at the detection of false claims.87
Investigation of criminal and public offenses is certainly a traditional gov-
ernment function.8 While investigating wrongdoing, generally, cannot be
said to be the exclusive power of the Government, investigating wrongs com-
mitted against the Government itself is a traditional and exclusive govern-
ment function. False Claims Act investigations concern wrongs committed
against the Government and specifically against the public fisc.
Courts have repeatedly held that the protection of the public fisc is a legiti-
mate, if not an exclusive, government interest.89 As the legislative history and
early cases make evident, Congress enacted the False Claims Act intending
84. Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17, 21-25 (2d Cir. 1979). Relying on
dicta in Flagg Bros., the court found that fire protection was an "exclusive municipal function" and
that the fire department was the state's agent. Id. at 22 (quoting Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 163-64).
85. Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761, 764 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974). The court held that it was "the
State which in effect is providing the care through the private institutions. This exercise of the
administrative placing prerogative does not affect in any way the State's ultimate responsibility
for the well-being of the children, and, consequently, the public nature of the function being
performed." Id. at 765.
86. See, e.g., Macias v. Wackenhut Corr. Corp., No. CV-F-03-5245 REC/DLB, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIIS 29296, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2005) (citing Rosborougb, 350 F.3d at 459; Skelton,
963 F.2d at 100) (private prison-management corporation); Chambers v. City of Frederick, 292
F. Supp. 2d 766, 770-72 (D. Md. 2003) (maintenance of a public park); C.K v. Nw. Human
Servs., 255 F. Supp. 2d 447, 451 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (private facility for delinquent, not dependent,
youth); Riesterv. Riverside Cmty. Sch., 257 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (private man-
agement of community school created under state law); Eggert v. Tuckerton Volunteer Fire Co.
No. 1, 938 F. Supp. 1230, 1239 (D.NJ. 1996) (volunteer fire department).
87. The case has been made that a relator's post-complaint, litigation-oriented conduct falls
under the public-fimction analysis as well because relators serve as "deputized" private attorneys
general. Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law
Ohjectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGs LJ.
1325, 1380 n.285 (1991).
88. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[i]nvestigation and prosecution
of federal crimes is one of the most important and essential functions within [Article II] respon-
sibility").
89. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes Props., Inc., 476 U.S. 593, 603 (1986) ("[T]he major
responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service is to protect the public fisc."); Heckler v. Cmty.
Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 63 n.17 (1984) ("[tjhe scope of this authority may be explicitly defined
by Congress or be limited by delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making
power"); West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1999) (upholding the EEOC's "legal authority
to enforce § 717 [of Title VII] through an award of compensatory damages"); Walkerv. Bain, 257
F.3d 660, 678 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Without question, the desire to protect public funds is a laudable
and legitimate goal of legislation.").
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to vindicate the Government's interest and to protect the public fisc. 0 As the
Second circuit noted, "[l]t is significant that the False Claims Act... was de-
signed by Congress to protect against retaliation the class of whistleblowers
whose activities benefit the public fisc."9' The D.C. Circuit noted that con-
cern over "'sophisticated and widespread fraud' depleting the national fisc"
spurred the 1986 Amendments to "enhance the Government's ability to re-
cover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Government." 92 The
Fourth Circuit noted that under the False Claims Act
the public interest here entrusted primarily to the government's protection is a
particularly substantial one. Unlike in various other contexts where governmental
action on behalf of an individual's interest has been held not to be barred by an
official's tardiness, here the government is prosecuting directly to protect the public fisc
itself against the massive drain .... 93
As briefly mentioned above, the delegation of government power to pri-
vate crime fighters also enjoys a lengthy history. Before the creation of public
police, a citizen in feudal England had an affirmative duty to respond to the
"hue and cry," thereby enforcing the King's law.94 In the late seventeenth cen-
tury, even after the creation of official police forces, the English Parliament
enacted legislation empowering "thief-takers," private citizen-detectives, to
investigate crimes in exchange for compensation "paid by the Government on
results."95 Thief-takers lacked official status, and anyone could become one,
although most were criminals themselves.96 Most importantly, thief-takers did
what the official police system was unwilling or unable to do: detect and ap-
prehend criminals.97 By the late eighteenth century, qui tam actions, as natural
extensions of thief-taking, were commonplace.98
90. Senator Howard, original sponsor of the Act, broadly asserted that its object was to provide
protection against those who would "cheat the United States." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess.
952 (1863); see also United Statesv. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885) (holdingthat theActwas
"intended to protect the treasury against the hungry and unscrupulous host that encompasse[d] it
on every side."), aff'd, 30 F. 762 (C.C.D. Or. 1887). Subsequent Supreme Court cases make clear
that the right vindicated is solely the Government's. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
317 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1943) ("[T]he device of double damages plus a specific sum was chosen to
make sure that the government would be made completely whole." (emphasis added)).
91. Brown v. City of S. Burlington, 393 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
92. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
93. United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1346 n.6 (4th Cir.
1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
94. See PHILIP RAWLINGS, POLICING: A SHORT HISTORY 16 (2002), which explains the process
whereby citizens of one town routinely carried on the hue and cry of a neighboring town.
95. PATRICK PRINGLE, HUE AND CRY: THE STORY OF HENRYANDJOHN FIELDING AND THEIR Bow
STREET RUNNERS 35 (1955).
96. Id. at 35-36.
97. Id.
98. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation,
78 N.C. L. REv. 539, 549-50, 550 n.35 (2000) (stating that qui tam actions had been in common
use since the fourteenth century). Qui tam actions eventually waned in popularity in England
with the development of capable public law enforcement and growing distrust for "overzealous"
informers pursuing their bounties. See 1 BOESE, supra note 8, § 1.01[A].
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If investigating federal crimes is a traditional government function, 9 in-
vestigating federal crimes committed against the treasury is implicitly the ex-
clusive responsibility of the Government. Thus, when a relator investigates
in furtherance of an FCA action, he does so to vindicate the Government's
interest in protecting the public fisc; he thereby exercises a traditional and
exclusive public function. Furthermore, the long history behind this type of
government delegation of authority supports, rather than undermines, find-
ing the investigative acts of qui tam relators quintessentially and exclusively
those of the Government itself.
C. Nexus Test
The alternative pathway to finding state action is the nexus test. The nexus
test breaks down into essentially three subtheories: 0 ° joint action theory, 1 1
coercion/inducement theory,"2 and symbiosis/entwinement theory.103 The
nexus test thus considers: whether a state has exercised "coercive power"
over a private entity or provided "significant encouragement, either overt
or covert'0 4; whether a private entity operates as a "willful participant in joint
activity with the state"' 5; or whether the private entity is entwined with gov-
ernmental policies.0 6 This note will examine coercion/inducement theory
and symbiosis/entwinement theories seriatim. 1 7
1. Coercion/Inducement Theory
The coercion/inducement theory requires that the Government have exer-
cised coercive power over a private entity or provided significant encourage-
ment such that "the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State."'0 0
Early cases applying this test held that "a State [was] responsible for the dis-
criminatory act of a private party when the State... ha[d] compelled the act,"
99. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
100. See John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C. L. REv.
569, 584-85 (2005).
101. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (whether a private party is "'a
willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents' "); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 931 (1982).
102. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
103. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (discussing whether
"the State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with the private party
that there is a symbiotic relationship between them); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351 (1974) ("whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged
action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself").
104. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
105. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941.
106. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 302 (2001).
107. This note does not analyze relator searches under the joint action theory because the
conduct considered by this note likely does not involve joint investigations by relators and gov-
ernment officials. See infra Part IV for a useful hypothetical.
108. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
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whether by "statutory provision or by a custom having the force of the law." 10 9
Mere regulation of an incident of private activity used in a privately discrimi-
natory manner, however, did not convert private into public action.'10 Not
even state-granted private monopoly power was sufficient to attribute private
conduct to the state. 1"
More recent cases recognized that private exercise of state-permitted ac-
tion did not suffice to attribute that exercise to the state itself."2 A state's
"imere acquiescence in a private action," as opposed to statutory compulsion,
did not "convert[] that action into that of the State.""' 3 Significant state en-
couragement, however, could convert private conduct into that of the state
itself if it sufficiently influenced that private conduct.' 14
2. Applying the Coercion/Inducement Theory to Relator Conduct
Under this theory, a court must consider whether a state has exercised
" coercive power" over a private entity or provided "significant encouragement,
either overt or covert," to the private actor."' Because the FCA scheme is
permissive-it neither requires a relator to blow the whistle nor compels him
or her to notify the Government under threat of penalty-a coercion theory
will not apply just as it did not apply in Blum v. Yarestky" 6 or Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Company."17
109. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170-71 (1970) (emphasis added). Adickes,
a white schoolteacher, was refused service at respondent-defendant Kress's restaurant when ac-
companied by several African American students. Id. at 146. Adickes sued the restaurant as a
co-conspirator under 31 U.S.C. § 1983 for her subsequent pretextual arrest for vagrancy by local
police. Id. at 146-47.
110. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,165 (1972). A private social club, whose
liquor sales were regulated by the state, racially discriminated against its members' guests. Id. at
164-65, 176 n.3, 176-77. The state's regulation alone did not "foster or encourage racial dis-
crimination," particularly where the state "neither approved nor endorsed" the Lodge's discrimi-
natory policies. Id. at 176-77, 176 n.3.
111. A private utility company, licensed and extensively regulated by the state, terminated the
respondent's power for nonpayment without notice or a hearing; the state permitted the termina-
tion procedure. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974); see also Pub. Util.
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952).
112. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978); see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353.
113. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164, 166 ("[T]he State of New York has not compelled the sale
of a bailor's goods, but has merely announced the circumstances under which its courts will not
interfere with a private sale.").
114. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (holding that a state must have "exer-
cised coercive power or... provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that
the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State"). A private nursing home's decision
to release or discharge patients without notice, resulting in adjustments to their state benefits,
was made by its private staff relying exclusively on "medical judgments... made according to
professional standards.., not established by the State." Id. at 1004-08. The state's adjustment of
Medicaid benefits in response to discharges and transfers did not constitute the state's approval
of those private decisions, notwithstanding that it received patient care assessment forms it was
federally required to review. Id. at 1010.
115. Id. at 1004.
116. Seeid.
117. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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The five critical features of the FCA do, however, provide significant encour-
agement to relators to conduct searches. The bounty and whistleblower protec-
tion provide relators with powerful incentives to begin searches, beyond the
mere licensure or regulation at issue in Moose Lodge and Jackson. Once begun,
the heightened pleading and original source requirements encourage relators
to dig deep for inculpatory evidence with the full authority of the Government
behind them because more frauds uncovered mean more bounty to be col-
lected. The high evidentiary threshold effectively guides relator conduct, as was
considered by the Court in Blum, and manifests more than mere acquiescence,
at issue in Flagg Bros. Expansive application of the Act, nongovernment inter-
vention suits, and the DRA's disclosure requirements, moreover, demonstrate
the Government's strong preference for private searches to uncover fraud.
3. Symbiosis/Entwinement
Symbiosis/entwinement analysis considers whether the Government has
"so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with the pri-
vate party that there is a "symbiotic relationship" between them or whether
the "nominally private character" of the relator is "overborne by the pervasive
entwinement" of the Federal Government in its conduct.'18 This part asserts
that the FCA's critical features create an interdependent relationship between
the Government and private relators such that it often overhears the nomi-
nally private conduct of relators.
Most of the state action tests, most notably symbiosis/entwinement,
trace their roots to Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.'19 Under Burton,
symbiosis/entwinement theory initially took an ad hoc, "totality" view of the
relationship between a state and private party and did not delineate a bright-
line rule on state action. 2 ° The Burton court found that a private coffee shop,
which leased space in a public parking building and received significant
benefits from the municipal parking authority' 21-which in turn relied on
increased coffee shop patronage for profits-was a state actor when it refused
to serve a black patron on the basis of race.'22 Burton's single "totality" view,
118. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961); Brentwood Acad. v.
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001).
119. 365 U.S. 715 (1961); see also BrandenJ. Tedesco, National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Tarkanian: A Death Knell for the Symbiotic Relationship Test, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 237, 242
(1990). The Court did previously apply a variation of the nexus test in Public Utililty Commission v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1952), although its ap-
plication was "tentative and somewhat opaque" until the "vigorous and comprehensive" analysis
in the now quintessential Burton. G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action
Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 Hous. L. REv. 333, 395 (1997).
120. The Court expressly suggested state action determinations be made on a case-by-case
basis. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725-26.
121. The shop received state assistance constructing and decorating the space for use as a res-
taurant and in furnishing utilities at no charge. Id. at 719-20. It also enjoyed tax-exempt status on
the $220,000 it spent "to make the space suitable for operation." Id. at 719. Building maintenance
was the state's responsibility and was paid for by public funds. Id. at 724.
122. Id. at 720.
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which left unanswered just how much interdependence was enough under
the law, 2 1 subsequently yielded to several more defined nexus tests, 124 derived
from three simultaneously decided cases collectively referred to as the "Blum
Trilogy"'12 and applied seriatim for nearly two decades.
126
Yet the Court harked back to its Burton roots when it decided Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School AthleticAss'n (TSSAA).'27 There, a private
interscholastic athletic association comprised almost entirely of state schools
and led by several state officials was deemed a state actor when it enforced
a speech-limiting recruiting rule against a member school because of the "per-
vasive entwinement" between the association and all member schools.'28 TSSAA's
private motives, imposed on member schools, triggered enforcement of its rules
in a way that could "fairly be attributed to the State.' 1 29 The majority plainly
reverted to pre-Blum Trilogy reasoning, stating that when "the relevant facts
show pervasive entwinement to the point of largely overlapping identity, the
implication of state action is not affected by pointing out that the facts might
not loom large under a different test."13 The Court also injected a "normative
judgment" element into the analysis, essentially allowing for a finding of state
action when there "may be some countervailing reason" for finding it.'
4. Applying Symbiosis/Entwinement Theories to Relator Conduct
Applying traditional Burton analysis to the FCA, consider that qui tam
suits currently contribute to at least half of the Government's annual recov-
ery under the scheme. To increase government recoveries, Congress and the
Department of Justice have consistently expanded the application of the Act
and the power of relators, particularly with the recent enactment of the
123. A confounded Justice Harlan noted, "The Court's opinion, by a process of first undis-
criminatingly [sic] throwing together various factual bits and pieces and then undermining the
resulting structure by an equally vague disclaimer, seems to me to leave completely at sea just
what it is in this record that satisfies the requirement of 'state action.'" Id. at 728 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). The last case applying Burton per se, before Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondaty
School Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), was Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299-300 (1966).
124. See Buchanan, supra note 119, at 399-421.
125. The Burger Court trifurcated state action theory into the distinct coercion/induce-
ment, joint action, and public function tests in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v.
Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982); and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 843
(1982).
126. Blurn, 457 U.S. at 991; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 843.
127. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
128. Id. at 290-92. The Tennessee State Board of Education designated TSSAA as the sole
organization supervising and regulating high school sports. Id. at 292. The bulk of TSSAA's rev-
enues came from gate receipts collected at football games and basketball tournaments; eligibility
requirements included minimum academic standards for student athletes, state teaching licen-
sure for coaches, and standardized financial aid. Id. at 291-92.
129. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
130. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 303.
131. Id. at 295-96 ("What is fairly attributable is a matter of normative judgment, and the
criteria lack rigid simplicity... [No one fact can function as a necessary condition across the
board for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there may
be some countervailing reason against attributing activity to the government.").
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DRA evidencing the Government's not-so-tacit and significant reliance on pri-
vate investigations. Relators, as assignees of the Government's interest,132 rely
on the Government for their reward, which only inheres if the Government
prevails against the defendant. To better reap the fruits of the relators' ef-
forts, Congress provides protection against, and access to federal courts for,
an employer's retaliatory conduct. As in Burton, a relator's inability to conduct
private searches would injure his ability to invoke federal protections and to
uncover government fraud, which prove "indispensable... [to the] financial
success" of the Government.133 All these features, in concert, suggest a rela-
tionship of interdependence to achieve a common purpose. 13 4
Brentwood's return to a totality-of-the-circumstances, normative view of
state action means, perhaps, that near misses under the other discrete state
action tests might not prevent a finding of state action. A court would con-
sider whether the "nominally private character" of the relator was "overborne
by the pervasive entwinement" of the Federal Government in its conduct.'35
Just as the critical features suggest state action under symbiosis theory, the
five critical features of the FCA arguably demonstrate state action under
Brentwood's entwinement approach.
From a normative perspective, allowing the Government to assign away
constitutional responsibilities for its own benefit strikes at the very heart of
state action theory. Some critics, moreover, have suggested that the Act gen-
erates excessive litigation, interferes with legitimate contractor management
choices, undermines internal compliance mechanisms, frustrates benign or
beneficial conduct, gives rival firms tools they can strategically use to impede
efficient rival behavior, and increases potential extortion,'36 notwithstanding
the Act's other redeeming virtues. Consider also that many relators are not
exactly patriots: they are often disgruntled employees or special-interest or-
ganizations, like Taxpayers Against Fraud (TAF), pursuing their own agendas
"often not consistent with those delineated by Congress."'37
132. The Supreme Court used a theory of "representational standing" to invalidate a chal-
lenge to a relator's Article III standing, stating that "a qui tam relator 'is, in effect, suing as a
partial assignee of the United States."' Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 773 n.4 (2000).
133. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
134. SeeJackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.3d 426,430 (4th Cir. 1987), which applies symbiosis theory
to couch bounty hunting as state action, discussed infra note 145 and accompanying text.
135. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001).
136. See Kovacic, supra note 3, at 1825-40.
137. RICHARD THORNBURGH, Introduction to JAMES T. BLANCH ET AL., CITIZEN SUITS AND QuI
TAM ACTIONS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY 3,3-5 (Roger Clegg &James L.J. Nuzzo
eds., 1996) ("[A] healthy skepticism about their motives and Congress's prolitigation regime is
appropriate... [T]he assignment of the executive branch's law-enforcement responsibility to
private parties-parties who are given quasi-governmental authority to pursue their own inter-
ests... at the expense of other private parties."); see Michael J. Davidson, Applying the False Claims
Act to Commercial IT Procurements, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 25, 40 (2004) ("[Q]ui tam litigation will
eventually partially fill [an] external oversight void as disgruntled employees.., bring FCA cases
alleging vendor misrepresentations to the United States."); see generally Taxpayers Against Fraud,
http://www.taf.org (last visited July 8, 2007).
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IV. COMPARING FALSE CLAIMS ACT RELATORS
TO OTHER PRIVATE ACTORS
A. Bounty Hunters
Many commentators have likened qui tam relators to bounty hunters.'38
The analogy has its merits. Qui tam relators and bounty hunters are usually
private citizens, not actual government officials. Like relators, bounty hunt-
ers fill a large gap in law enforcement and "play[] a critical role in the judicial
system."' 39 "Often, bounty hunters work with police departments in order
to locate and to capture a fugitive,"'14 just as qui tam relators work with the
Department of Justice and U.S Attorney's Offices to identify and punish
those who defraud the Government. And much like qui tam suits, which have
been on the rise in recent years, the bounty hunting industry in the United
States has grown in line with annual rises in arrests.141
Yet courts, including the Supreme Court, have consistently refused to color
bounty hunters state actors, 141 placing few restraints on their conduct aside
from general criminal and tort law limitations. 143 In one of the only federal
cases to find a bounty hunter' 44 a state actor, Jackson v. Pantazes,141 the Fourth
Circuit held that a bail bondsman acted under color of state law because
he was "'subrogated to the rights and means possessed by the State'...'to
the extent necessary to [capture a fugitive]'" and "'[to] restrain him of his
liberty.',146 The court focused generally on the symbiotic relationship between
138. See Frank LaSalle, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden of Proof or
Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REv. 497, 501 n.29 (1995) ("Some critics have argued that the Act simply
turns disgruntled employees into bounty hunters"); William B. Rubinstein, On What a "Private
Attorney General"Is-And Why It Matters, 57 VAmN. L. REv. 2129, 2144 (2004) ("[A relator] is a self-
appointed bounty hunter, pursuing government fraud where the government has not done so.").
139. See Andrew D. Patrick, Running from the Law: Should Bounty Hunters Be Considered State
Actors and Thus Subject to ConstitutionalRestraints? 52 VARD. L. Rav. 171, 176 (1999). Studies sug-
gest that public law enforcement is ill-equipped to wrangle in rampant bail-skipping. See Sasha
Abramsky, Citizen's Arrest, NEw YORK, Jan. 5, 1998, at 37; Andrea Gerlin, On the Loose: Criminal
Defendants Released Without Bail Spark a Heated Debate, W~ALL ST. J., July 9, 1996, at Al ("[M]any
locally run [bail bond] programs have outgrown their capacity to assess and monitor defendants
released under their auspices.").
140. Emily M. Stout, Bounty Hunters as Evidence Gatherers: Should They Be Considered State
Actors Under the Fourth Amendment When Working with the Police? 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 665, 670
(1997).
141. See Scott Winokur, Bounty Hunters in the New West, S.F. EXAM'R, Nov. 28, 1995, at B1;
Patrick, supra note 139, at 176 ("Bounty hunters apprehend approximately 25,000 fugitives within
the United States each year.").
142. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1872).
143. For example, bounty hunters may kick down doors, make warrandess entries and arrests,
conduct nonconsensual searches, and pursue fugitives across state lines. See Patrick, supra note
139, at 172; Stout, supra note 140, at 666, 670.
144. A bondsman who chooses not to recover the bailed person himself often outsources re-
covery to a bounty hunter. See Hugh Gibbons & Nicholas Skinner, The Biological Basis of Human
Rights, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 51, 71 (2003) ("The bounty hunter is an agent of the bail bondsman,
receiving a fee to return the bailed person, the principal, who has jumped bail to custody.").
145. 810 F.2d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 1987).
146. Id. at 429 (citations omitted).
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bail bondsmen and the Maryland criminal court system, most notably that the
state licensed bondsmen-who made their livelihood "upon the judicial use of
a bail bond system"' 47-to facilitate the pretrial release of defendants, monitor
their whereabouts, and ensure they appeared for trial. 1
48
Other circuits have not been persuaded. The Ninth Circuit refused to hold
that a bondsman was a state actor despite statutory authority to arrest, focus-
ing instead on the bondsman's common-law right arising out of contract to
apprehend his principal. 149 The court made clear that
the bail bondsman is in the business in order to make money and is not acting
out of a high-minded sense of devotion to the administration of justice.... [T]he
bondsman was acting 'to protect his own private financial interest and not to vindicate
the interest of the state."5
The Fifth Circuit held that a bondsman's "mere possession of an arrest
warrant [did] not render [him] a state actor," particularly when he "neither
purport[ed] to act pursuant to the warrant, nor enlist[ed] the assistance of law
enforcement officials in executing the warrant."'' The Eighth Circuit did not
consider a bounty hunter a state actor when he provided information about
suspects of police interest in exchange for the whereabouts of the principals
he sought. 2 Nevertheless, recent district court cases involving bounty hunt-
ers (post-Brentwood) have suggested a reconsideration of these issues.'53
B. Distinguishing Relator Searches from Bounty Hunting
The great weight of authority against bounty hunters as state actors might
suggest that qui tam relators would likewise fail to pass muster as state actors
147. Id. at 430.
148. Id. The court also considered that Pantazes acted jointly with police officers to apprehend
the fugitive. Id. at 427-28.
149. Ouzts v. Md. Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[T]he common law right
of the bondsman to apprehend his principal arises out of a contract between the parties and does
not have its genesis in statute or legislative fiat. Because it is a contract right it is transitory and
may be exercised wherever the defendant may be found.").
150. Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
151. Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc., 75 F.3d 200, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh
Circuit also appears to have taken this approach. See Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304, 307-08 (1lth
Cir. 1987).
152. See Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001, 1005-06 (8th Cir. 1997), where the Court reasoned:
Providing information about a criminal suspect to law enforcement is not a traditional gov-
ernmental function; it is something that private citizens do every day. Olibas did not rely on
governmental assistance or benefits in filing the affidavit; he filed it on his own and of his own free
will, without the aid or encouragement of the state. In short, Olibas filed the affidavit as a
private citizen....
Id. at 1005 (emphasis added). An Arkansas statute authorized "'any credible person' to file an
affidavit requesting a fugitive's arrest." Id. at 1006.
153. See, e.g., Tirreno v. Mott, 453 F. Supp. 2d 562, 565 (D. Conn. 2006); Brady v. Maasikas,
No. 3:05-0355, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28453, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. May 9, 2006). But cf. Weaver v.
James Bonding Co., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1223-29 (S.D. Ala. 2006); Anderson v. Moats,
No. 1:03CV152, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29707, at *3 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 3, 2004); Green v.
Abony Bail Bond, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1260-62 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
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under similar analysis. However, one should note that the FCA is an un-
equivocal statutory assignment of government authority to private persons
rather than mere regulation of private conduct, which is the most that can
be said for bounty hunting in those states that permit it. 15 4 The breadth
of the FCA, the specificity of its requirements, protections, and benefits,
and the overt government preference for the conduct it produces further
distinguish private relator searches from those of the typical bounty hunter.
Rather than merely permitting action, the FCA induces and directs private
relator searches by promising a reward and demanding specific, original
information.
The reward proves most significant of all. As most circuits have held, when
a bounty hunter retrieves his principal, he vindicates his privately created pe-
cuniary interest. A qui tam relator, on the other hand, vindicates a pecuni-
ary interest that only exists because the Government offers it to him. Finally,
one should note that most of the courts that have recently considered bounty
hunting have not used Brentwood-like analysis, except for the Fourth Circuit
when it found state action in Pantazes.
C. IRS Informants
The Internal Revenue Service, like other government agencies, cannot
keep up with its workload' s and welcomes tips from people who "suspect or
know of an individual or company that is not complying with the tax laws.)'15 6
Although not a qui tam provision, the IRS "rewards for information" pro-
gram compensates informants for information they provide identifying tax
fraud."5 7 Rewards are paid according to a discretionary reward schedule based
on the value of the information provided. 8 In December 2006, Congress and
President Bush doubled the maximum payable rewards, which now include
interest, tax, and penalties."5 9
154. See, generally, John A. Chamberlin, Bounty Hunters: Can the Criminal Justice System Live
Without Them? 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 1175, 1190-93 (1998).
155. Data from 2000 revealed that the IRS audited fewer than one-half of one percent of all
returns. See Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration Enforcement,
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 922 (2006). Staffing shortages "forced the IRS to write off billions in
unpaid taxes." Id.
156. I.R.S., How Do You Report Suspected Tax Fraud, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/
enforcement/article/0,,id=106778,00.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2008); see also I.R.S., Internal
Revenue Manual, ch. 25.2.1 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/chO2sOl.html
(last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
157. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2000) (authorizing the payment of "such sums" as the secretary of
the Treasury "deems necessary" for detecting and prosecuting underpayment).
158. Rewards range from 0 to 15 percent, with a $100 minimum and $10 million maximum
reward, "in proportion to the value of the information [the informant] furnished voluntarily
and on [his] own initiative..." I.R.S., PUBL'N No. 733, REWARDS FOR INFORMATION PROVIDED
BY INDIVIDUALS TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-pdf/p733.pdf.
159. Kathy M. Kristof, Tax Whistleblowers Given More Incentive, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 2007,
at C3.
Raising the Hue... and Crying
The IRS receives thousands of tips per year concerning billions of tax
dollars, 60 aiding in the recovery of millions."' Informants, in return, have
received millions of dollars. 162 Rewards, however, are purely within the dis-
cretion of the IRS and are not guaranteed by statute, even if the informant
satisfies the statutory requirements. 63
In one of the only cases considering whether an IRS reward for infor-
mation implicated the Fourth Amendment, United States v. Snowadzki,164 the
Ninth Circuit held that an IRS reward for information did not sufficiently en-
courage a private informant's seizure of tax records to warrant their exclusion
at trial. Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, the court found insufficient evi-
dence that "the seizure was motivated by IRS prompting or encouragement,"
notwithstanding the offer of a reward.1 6' The court considered it critical that
the informant had already collected the records before an IRS agent told him
they would be "helpful" and that an award "might be available."' 66
D. Distinguishing Relators from IRS Informants
Although the IRS program rewards private informants for valuable tips
without directly implicating state action theory, the FCA remains distinct
enough to warrant further scrutiny. First, unlike the FCA's guaranteed share
of the bounty, the IRS reward is wholly discretionary and speculative-if
the IRS does not pay up, a scorned informant has no cause of action. 167 The
Federal Circuit has held that the very broad language in 26 U.S.C. § 762 3 and
its accompanying regulation, promulgated and amended by the IRS, describes
"an indefinite reward offer that an informant may respond to by his conduct"
as opposed to an "enforceable contract [that] arises when the parties fix the
reward."168
Second, the FCA, unlike the IRS program, guarantees a proportion of the
Government's collected booty and puts the minimum amount paid beyond
the discretion of the soliciting entity (i.e., the Department of Justice). By
160. See Manns, supra note 155, at 922.
161. The IRS collected nearly $84 million in 1998, paying nearly $7 million to informants. See
Daniel Currell & Marsha Ferziger, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal
Civil Bounty Progmams, 99 U. ILL. L. REv. 1141, 1168 (1999).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1153.
164. 723 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1984).
165. Id. at 1429-30 ("While Pugh may have acted in part from a desire for a reward, there is
no evidence that the seizure was motivated by IRS prompting or encouragement.").
166. Id. at 1428-29.
167. To have a chance, a litigant would have to overcome the sovereign immunity problem.
See Swofford v. United States, No. 99-CV-4064-JPG, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7730, at *2 (S.D.
Ill. May 17, 2000).
168. Krug v. United States, 168 F.3d 1307, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Merrick v. United
States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Henry v. United States, No. CIV.A. 02-968,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17418, at *14-15 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 2002) (relying onMerrick to hold that
"[n]either 26 U.S.C. § 7623 nor 26 C.F.R. § 301.7623-1, standing alone, obligates the IRS to pay a
reward to a tax informant"); Schein v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 182, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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inextricably tying relator recovery to the Government's, the FCA encour-
ages private searches for the mutual, shared benefit of the Government and
relators. Neither can recover without the other. Moreover, as the Federal
Circuit addressed in Krug, the reward is sufficiently fixed (by percentage) and
effectively gives rise to an enforceable right vested in the relator should the
Government try not to pay.
V. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES IF A RELATOR
IS A STATE ACTOR?
Picture this: A disgruntled new hire working for a government contractor
receives information from his employer about his rights as a potential gov-
ernment whistleblower, including the promise of a reward, the availability of
whistleblower protection, and the presence of an original source requirement.
He suspects his employer might be making fraudulent claims but has nothing
concrete enough to support a formal action. Enticed by the bounty and em-
boldened by the Government's protection, he roots through private records
and scours others' offices. He makes copies of documents and stores them in
a safe-deposit box in his home.169
After amassing enough evidence, he notifies the Government and files a
civil complaint. The Government takes over the action and proceeds with
criminal and administrative investigations based initially on the evidence
the employee provides. Many months later, the employer settles the criminal
and civil charges for a few million dollars. The employee, who has long
since left the entity's employ, receives a fat government check.
Such a scenario, if it involved federal agents instead of the private em-
ployee, would likely implicate the Fourth Amendment. Presuming a relator
is a government actor, as this note asserts, the search and seizure described
in the hypothetical would have two serious consequences. First, the relator
might be personally liable for money damages to the subject of his search;
second, the evidence obtained by the relator, and all evidence gained subse-
quently as "fruit of the poisonous tree,"17' would be inadmissible in parallel
noncivil actions.
A. Relator Liability for Money Damages in a Bivens Action
A relator may be subject to personal liability for money damages for the
injuries an aggrieved defendant suffered as a result of his unconstitutional
search and seizure. 7' Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant must prove that
169. This hypothetical closely parallels the facts of Battle v. Board of Regents, 468 F.3d 755,
757-58 (11th Cir. 2006).
170. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, as applied in the Fourth Amendment context,
means "evidence otherwise admissible but discovered as a result of an earlier violation is excluded
as tainted." Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 612 n.4 (2004).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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he was deprived "of a right secured by the Constitution" and that the defen-
dant deprived him of that right under color of state law.'72
Although § 1983 only applies to conduct under color of state law, the Sup-
reme Court recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics'7 3 a cause of action implicit in the Fourth Amendment for
unreasonable searches and seizures by federal agents acting under color of
federal authority. 7 4 The elements of a Bivens action are identical to those
under § 1983."''1 Unfortunately for relators subject to Bivens litigation, they
cannot rely on qualified immunity to avoid litigation or preclude liability be-
cause they are private parties, not actual government officials, acting under
color of law.'76 Possible "good faith" immunity could be raised, although the
Supreme Court has not decided that issue.'77
Ultimately, the scope of the FCA action defendant's damages might in-
clude the penalties and attorney fees it paid the Government. The relator
would effectively reimburse an FCA action defendant for penalties and costs
while the Government would retain all the money it collected, irrespective
of the source. The specter of personal liability could no doubt deter legally
unsophisticated relators from investigating at all.
B. Suppression of Relator-Collected Evidence in Noncivil Proceedings
Defendants also may attempt to suppress evidence obtained by private rela-
tors used in parallel criminal and administrative proceedings against them.'78
In order to qualify for exclusion or suppression, however, a defendant must
prove that the Government was significantly involved in the private search by
using the private citizen as its instrument who complied with its demands. 17 9
After all, a court must be able to distinguish between a citizen merely pro-
viding aid sua sponte and a citizen being used by law enforcement to avoid
constitutional restraints. 8 °
1. Case-by-Case "Government Instrument" Analysis
As stated above, the Government must be significantly involved in the
private search and seizure for privately obtained evidence to be suppressible.
172. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970) (internal quotations omitted).
173. 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
174. Id. at 389.
175. See Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991).
176. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992) ("[T]he rationales mandating qualified im-
munity for public officials are not applicable to private parties.").
177. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413-14 (1997).
178. "The exclusionary rules were fashioned 'to prevent, not to repair,' and their target is
official misconduct. They are 'to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effec-
tively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."' Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
179. Id. at 487.
180. See id. at 489-90.
Public Contract Law Journal * Vol. 37, No. 2 e Winter 2008
Following decisions in two private search/suppression cases-the Supreme
Court's Walter v. United States"5 ' and the Ninth Circuit's United States v.
Miller'82-a majority of the circuit courts adopted a two-prong test to de-
termine whether a private citizen acted as an instrument or agent of the
government: "(1) whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the in-
trusive conduct, and (2) whether the party performing the search intended to
assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends."'83 Some circuits
also consider whether "the [G]overnment... offered the private actor a re-
ward, 1 84 whether government agents "openly encouraged or cooperated in
the search, '185 "whether the citizen acted at the [G]overnment's request," '186 or
whether the "Government coerce[d], dominate[d] or direct[ed] the actions of
[the] private person."' 87 Courts conduct their analysis on a case-by-case basis
and in light of all of the circumstances.'88
2. Schemewide Invalidation
The Supreme Court also addressed the constitutionality of private searches
generally spurred by a federal statutory scheme in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n. 189 The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 gave the secre-
tary of Transportation broad discretion to promulgate regulations to ensure
safety on the railroads. 9 ° To address rampant and dangerous substance abuse
among railroad employees, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) ad-
opted regulations that authorized, but did not require, private railroads to
take blood and urine samples of those "employees who violate[d] certain
rules."'' Noting that "[t]he fact that the Government ha[d] not compelled a
181. 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
182. 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982).
183. Id. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits strictly fol-
low the Miller approach. See United States v. Alexander, 447 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v.Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339,
344 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1045 (1 1th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Crowley, 285 F.3d 553,558 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1017-18 (5th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Snowadzki, 723 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cit. 1984). The Second Circuit
has cited Miller without strictly applying the two-prong analysis adopted by the other circuits.
See United States v. Bennett, 709 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1983) (which considers the "degree of
governmental knowledge and acquiescence"). The First Circuit merely identifies several relevant
factors it will consider and eschews "'any specific 'standard' or 'test'" because it considers a
bright-line rule as "'oversimplified or too general to be of help."' United States v. Momoh, 427
F.3d 137, 140-41 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997)).
184. Crowley, 285 F.3d at 558 (citing United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 1998),
and United States v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1997)).
185. United States v. Ford, 765 F.2d 1088, 1090 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
186. United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047,1053-54 (8th Cit. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Smith, 383 F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 2004)).
187. United States v. Alexander, 447 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cit. 2006) (quoting Pleasant v.
Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 796 (10th Cit. 1989)).
188. Id.
189. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
190. Id. at 606.
191. Id.
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private party to perform a search [did] not, by itself, establish that the search
[was] a private one," '92 the Court said it was unwilling to conclude that pri-
vate adherence to the "permissive" regulations within the scheme per se did
not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 193 The Court considered as "clear in-
dices of the Government's encouragement, endorsement, and participation"
that a covered employee could not decline a request to submit to the private
tests, that an employee who refused to be tested faced termination, that the
Government had "removed all legal barriers to the testing," and that it had
"made plain not only its strong preference for testing, but also its desire to
share the fruits of such intrusions." 194 Thus, private searches pursuant to the
FRA regulations implicated the Fourth Amendment."1
3. So Does a Relator Act as a Government Instrument?
The circuits' case-by-case approach, inquiring whether a relator intends to
assist law enforcement or to further his own ends, will depend on the unique
facts of every case. A court will need to assess what specifically motivated
the relator to conduct the search. That said, the federal courts presume that
the offer of a bounty, which is inextricably tied to the Government's recov-
ery," 6 primarily motivates a relator's conduct"97 and only exists because the
Government allows it. Whistleblower protections direct a relator to go be-
yond his or her typical job duties to obtain evidence by offering protection
in exchange. Similarly, the original source requirement and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b) direct a relator's investigatory conduct by requiring
he or she be able to independently and directly show the who, what, when,
where, and how of the fraud. Considering also the DRA's newly mandated
disclosures, relators bringing actions against DRA-compliant entities should
be presumed to know their rights and requirements under the FCA and to act
accordingly.
Applying Skinner-like analysis to the FCA at the schemewide level, the
FCA closely parallels the FRA regulations at issue in Skinner. First, the FCA
is permissive because it does not require potential relators to become ac-
tual relators. Like the private railroads in Skinner, however, relators forfeit
a number of benefits by not embracing the Government's goals as their own
(reward, protection, etc.). Second, government contractors who refuse to
subject themselves to relators' investigations, like the employees in Skinner,
192. Id. at 615.
193. Id. at 614.
194. Id. at 615-16.
195. Id. at 615 ("specific features of the regulations combine to convince us that the Government
did more than adopt a passive position toward the underlying private conduct").
196. "Any payment to a person under the first or second sentence of this paragraph shall be
madefrom the proceeds." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
197. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997) ("As a
class of plaintiffs, qui tam relators are different in kind than the Government. They are motivated
primarily by prospects of monetay reward rather than the public good.") (emphasis added).
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open themselves to loss of government privileges and potential liability for
retaliation. Finally, the original source jurisdictional bar, in conjunction with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and FCA-provided protection against
retaliation for conduct in furtherance of an action, arguably evidences the
Government's strong preference for private searches because it will share and
benefit greatly from the fruits of those searches. A relator must have direct
and independent knowledge of the information provided, which must be very
specific and must be collected by means beyond the regular scope of one's job
duties to implicate the Act's protections.
The very purpose of the Act is to uncover evidence of fraud. If relator-
collected evidence is deemed inadmissible, it loses significant intrinsic value
to the Government because it cannot be leveraged against FCA defendants
in noncivil proceedings. If relators are also potentially personally liable for
money damages, the FCA gets squeezed from both ends: relators are chilled
from undertaking investigations and, if they do conduct illicit searches, the
Government receives the fruits of investigation that are less valuable.
VI. THE WEAKNESSES OF THIS ANALYSIS
Because state action theory has not been raised to challenge any FCA
investigations of record, one must consider the potential weaknesses of this
analysis and the presumptions on which it proceeds. First, state action tests
depend on the peculiar facts of every case. There will be cases that will not
support this theory, and in those cases where the facts suggest state action,
a relator's motives must be evident-proof of which would prove time con-
suming and difficult. For example, if the hypothetical employee discussed
in Part V, supra, acted solely to get back at his employer or out of some
sense of patriotism, he might be able to rebut the presumption articulated in
Hughes Aircraft9 ' that he was solely motivated by the promise of a reward.
Alternative motivations would frustrate findings of state action and govern-
ment instrumentality.'99
Second, state action theory has been stretched most often in race-
based cases. The bulk of cases this note cites in which the Supreme Court
found state action, namely, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, Adickes v.
Kress, Evans v. Newton, and Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete, involved racial
discrimination. The Fourteenth Amendment, a post-bellum amendment,
begot state action theory, and the Civil Rights Movement fomented its
198. Id.
199. See United States v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1997) ("A private citizen might
decide to aid in the control and prevention of criminal activity out of his or her own moral con-
viction, concern for his or her employer's public image or profitability, or even desire to incarcer-
ate criminals, but even if such private purpose should happen to coincide with the purposes of the
government, 'this happy coincidence does not make a private actor an arm of the government' ")
(quoting United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 850-51 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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development."° Even so, cases like Skinner and Brentwood demonstrate the
Supreme Court's willingness to be creative in non-race-based cases.
Third, defendants' Fourth Amendment rights also will depend on the
peculiar facts of every case. In those cases where the Fourth Amendment
does apply, the various exceptions to a warrant requirement, e.g., the special
needs exception, may shield the relator from liability and the evidence from
suppression." 1 Finally, this approach arguably flies in the face of Congress's
intent to protect whistleblowers by subjecting them to personal liability for
government-sanctioned behavior. In many cases, the relator will think he is
doing the "right thing," not realizing he may be doing something illicit.
VII. SOLUTIONS
In 1863, when Congress passed the original False Claims Act, state action
theory did not exist. Over the course of the following 140-plus years, state
action theory, and the Federal Government itself, appreciably expanded in
ways the FCA's original sponsors could never have anticipated. Today, the
FCA and its companion legislation are on a collision course with the body of
modern state action jurisprudence, but calamity can be averted.
This note has identified five features that, in concert, potentially subject
private relators to personal liability and call for the inadmissibility of relator-
collected evidence. Understanding that state action and Fourth Amendment
analyses are very fact specific, minor tweaks to any of the five features
may suffice to dispel concern for the Government's involvement in relator
conduct.
First, Congress might consider switching to a mixed compensation plan
instead of a guaranteed percentage payout to successful relators. Based on the
Supreme Court's holding in United States ex rel. Stevens,2 ' the relator must
be assigned some portion of the judgment to protect his standing to bring
an action. But Congress could lower the significant percentages guaranteed
by § 3730 to a flat, single-digit percentage (think 1 percent) plus a staggered
payout schedule, similar to that used by the IRS based on the value of the
information provided (independent of the outcome of the case). This would
both preserve relator standing and reduce potential findings of overwhelming
inducement by reward.
200. See Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action, and the Allocation ofResponsibility
for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1053, 1062-63 (1990); Paul Schiff
Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional Norms
to "Private" Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1285 (2000).
201. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (recogniz-
ing exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements when "special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracti-
cable").
202. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 n.4
(2000).
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Second, Congress could go beyond the DRA's mandatory disclosure re-
quirements and provide, or require states or organizations to provide, guide-
lines to all potential relators on how to properly obtain information without
violating the target's Fourth Amendment rights. Just as many states require
businesses to provide mandatory sexual harassment and workplace safety
training, so too could the states or the Federal Government require similar
training to potential relators. Alternatively, the Federal Government could
make training a precondition to government contracting, putting the cost and
obligation of self-protection on those who contract with the Government.
Finally, federal and state governments could focus on instituting better
government-side auditing systems to detect fraud rather than relying on con-
tractor-side whistleblowers to uncover and report it. Recent efforts by the
IRS to outsource private debt collection provide a salient example.0 3
VIII. CONCLUSION
The False Claims Act is an essential tool in combating government contract
fraud, and its qui tam provision contributes greatly to its vitality. However,
several features of the scheme, when acting in concert, potentially convert
the private conduct of qui tam relators into government action. With ever-
broadening application of the Act and federal promulgation of mandatory
disclosure requirements and state incentives, the manifest problems of the
scheme will only continue to multiply.
Although findings of state action will depend on the peculiar facts of every
case, such findings could subject relators to personal liability under Bivens.
Findings of state action also might render useful information collected by rela-
tors inadmissible in concurrent criminal and administrative proceedings. Both
outcomes would undermine the policies driving the Act by deterring those
sought for help from coming to the Government's aid and by frustrating non-
civil enforcement.
If small changes to the Act can be made, or if the Federal Government can
give more guidance to potential qui tam relators, many of the intrinsic prob-
lems identified by this note can be neutralized. The False Claims Act can then
continue to effectively deter and punish government contract fraud without
colliding head-on with state action jurisprudence.
203. For an overview of the IRS's use of private collection agencies, see I.R.S. Announcement
2006-63 (Aug. 23, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/a-06-63.pdf.
